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Visual object similarity, action similarity and semantic information are believed 
to influence both object naming and action production. The Naming and Action 
Model (NAM) developed by Yoon, Heinke, and Humphreys (2002) suggests 
that naming objects requires access to semantics, but that there are two routes 
to action production; an indirect route via semantics, and a direct route that 
bypasses semantics. For example, when presented with a known object like a 
hammer, one may retrieve action information from the representational 
knowledge of its function or directly from its visual characteristics. Past 
research suggests that producing actions with known objects relies mostly on 
using the direct route and producing actions with novel objects relies mostly on 
using the indirect route via semantics. However, this has not been clearly 
shown. Therefore, the current study examines the role of semantics on object 
naming and producing actions when training on novel object-action 
associations. Participants were asked to learn novel object-action associations 
that were labeled with either the names of semantically similar items or 
semantically dissimilar items. After an initial learning session, participants 
named the objects, produced novel actions with the objects and produced novel 
actions with a cylinder in response to the previously learned labels. Participants 
then practiced the actions with the objects over three sessions. During the final 
session, participants were given a reminder of the object-action associations 
and then they were tested on them again. Results showed that before and after 
practice, participants made more naming errors and action errors with the 
cylinder for objects associated with semantically similar labels than objects 
associated with semantically dissimilar labels. This suggests that when naming 
objects and producing actions with the cylinder before and after practice, 
participants were likely relying on the semantic route. However, when 




different. Before practice, participants made more action errors with objects 
associated with semantically similar labels than objects associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels. After practice, participants made equivalent 
numbers of action errors for objects associated with semantically similar and 
dissimilar labels. This suggests that participants were likely using the semantic 
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Recognizing objects and using them is something that we, as humans, 
perform every single day.  Even so, this very important ability is most of the 
time taken for granted. For example, when looking at a pencil, we automatically 
recognize that it is a pencil and it is used for writing. However, some people 
might lose this important ability. For instance, some neurological patients have 
difficulty recognizing or naming objects, while others have difficulty using 
objects. One type of error that these patients make is a substitution error. This 
error occurs when a target object or action is substituted with another object or 
action (Giovannetti, Libon, Buxbaum, & Schwartz, 2007). An example of an 
object substitution error is using a spon to spread butter instead of using a knife. 
An example of an action substitution error is spooning rather than pouring 
cream into coffee. These substitution errors are not made exclusively by 
neurological patients. It seems that every once in a while, healthy people make 
substitution errors as well. Since recognizing objects and using them is 
something that we do everyday, it is very important to examine the factors that 
influence errors on object naming and producing actions with objects. Past 
research has suggested that visually similar objects take more time to be 
identified than visually dissimilar objects (Humphreys & Forde, 2001). Also, it 
has been shown that people have difficulty recognizing that two similar gestures 
represent the same gesture (Ska & Croisile, 1998). In essence, visual object 
similarity and action similarity influence both object naming and producing 
actions with objects. Another factor that seems to influence object recognition 
and action production is semantics. The semantic system is defined as the store 
of meaningful information for words and objects such as category, functions, 
and other associated relationships (Rothi & Heilman, 1997). Past research has 
shown that when naming objects, people confuse semantically similar objects 
more often than semantically dissimilar objects (Vitkovitch, Humphreys, & 




remains unclear. Therefore, the current study examines the role of semantics on 
errors of naming and producing actions with objects when training on object-
action associations. 
Research on brain injured patients suggests that there is a dissociation 
between object recognition and action identification or production. First, several 
studies have shown patients who had difficulty in naming objects, but 
demonstrated relatively normal performance using them. For example, 
Schwartz, Barrett, Crucian, and Heilman (1998) described a patient, W.A., who 
had damage in the occipital-temporal regions.  When they visually presented 
the tools to him, he could not name them. However, when they tactilely 
presented the tools to him when his eyes were closed and when they gave him a 
verbal description of the tools, he could name most of them. In addition, he 
performed very well when he gestured to command and when he imitated 
gestures. Overall, W.A. was able to recognize gestures, but he was unable to 
recognize visually presented objects. Similarly, Riddoch, Humphreys, Heslop, 
and Castermans (2002) tested patient M.C., who had Alzheimer’s disease, on 
his ability to name and use real objects. When they visually presented the 
objects to him, he named only 55.9 % of the presented objects. On the other 
hand, he performed well when he produced the actions associated with the 
objects; he produced correct actions 84.8 % of the time. These results suggest 
that patients can show correct use of objects for objects they can not name 
correctly. 
Second, several studies have shown patients who had difficulty in using 
objects, but demonstrated relatively normal performance in naming them.  For 
instance, Hodges, Spatt, and Patterson (1999) asked patient F.L., who had 
corticobasal degeneration, to name and use real objects. When they presented 
her with twenty objects, she correctly named most of them. However, she 




dissociation between object naming and producing actions with objects suggests 
that object recognition and action production are two independent processes.  
The first section of the introduction will further explore the influence of 
semantics in recognizing or naming objects. Similarly, the second section will 
explore the influence of semantics in producing actions with objects. In the 
third section, a general model of naming and gesturing in response to objects is 
presented. The model will illustrate how access to semantics is required when 
naming objects, whereas access to semantics is not required when producing 
actions in response to objects. The fourth section will raise issues regarding the 
use of common objects to investigate object naming and producing actions with 
objects.  This section will explain how the use of common objects results in 
problems in interpreting findings which can be avoided by using novel objects. 
The fifth section will introduce the current study, which aims to demonstrate the 
role of semantics in naming and producing actions with novel objects. 
1.1 Recognizing or Naming Objects 
1.1.1 Patients 
Patients with optic aphasia have difficulty naming objects. Beauvois and 
Saillant (1985) described optic aphasic patients as being impaired in naming 
visually presented objects but not in using objects. Hillis and Caramazza (1995) 
tested an optic aphasic patient, D.H.Y. on her picture naming abilities by asking 
her to name two hundred and sixty line drawings of objects. D.H.Y. could not 
name 90 % of the drawings, and 75 % of her errors were semantic. For 
example, when D.H.Y. was presented with a line drawing of an axe, she would 
call it a wrench. This was a semantic error since both the axe and the wrench 
belong to the category of tools. It is worth noting that D.H.Y was able to name 
objects when given a definition and when she was able to interact with the 




presented with the drawings visually. Then, the researchers wanted to determine 
at what level of the semantic system D.H.Y. was impaired. First, they tested her 
ability to access the semantic system by asking her to sort 26 pictures into 
animal or plant categories. Also, they asked her to identify which two of three 
presented pictures were related.  For instance, she had to choose which two of 
pear, light bulb, and light switch were related. D.H.Y. was 100 % correct on 
both of these tasks, and therefore showed good access to the semantic system. 
Next, the researchers tested her ability to process semantic information by 
making the previous tests more specific. For example, they asked her to sort 
pictures into dogs and cats categories. Also, they presented her with two 
semantically related pictures, and asked her to identify which one was related to 
a third picture. For instance, they asked her to identify which one of a light bulb 
and a traffic light is associated with a light switch. D.H.Y.’s performance on 
both of these tasks dropped dramatically to 57.9 % compared to when she was 
given the tasks the first time. Hillis and Caramazza concluded that D.H.Y. was 
impaired in accessing complete semantic information from vision since she 
showed a drop in performance when she was required to access specific 
information to distinguish between semantically related pictures compared to 
when she was required to access general information.  
Similar to patients with optic aphasia, patients with semantic dementia 
have difficulty naming objects. Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, and 
Spatt (2000) tested nine patients with semantic dementia on their naming 
abilities by asking them to name colour photographs depicting twenty common 
objects. Results showed that all nine patients had impaired naming ability. More 
specifically, four of the nine patients could not name any photograph.  Also, 
Hodges et al. (2000) tested the patients on their semantic abilities. One of the 
tests was matching objects for shared purpose. In this test, they showed the 




photograph. Then, they asked the patients to choose which of the three objects 
could be used instead of the target object. For example, they showed patients a 
photograph of scissors and they asked them to choose between photographs of 
knife, sellotape and pliers. They found that eight of the nine patients performed 
below the normal range. More specifically, five of the patients performed at 
chance. Hence, the patients appeared to have impaired semantic knowledge. 
Overall, the pattern of naming errors from patients with optic aphasia and 
semantic dementia suggests that semantics play an integral role in naming 
visually presented objects. However, in order to have a complete picture of the 
role of semantics in naming objects, evidence from healthy adults needs to be 
discussed. 
1.1.2 Healthy Adults 
Similar to patients who have already a difficulty in naming visually 
presented objects, healthy people can be induced to confuse object names by the 
use of the deadline method. Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) asked healthy 
participants to name line drawings of objects under a deadline of 450 ms. 
Essentially, in a deadline condition, participants are required to respond as fast 
as possible while trying to be as accurate as possible.  The deadline procedure is 
used to induce participants to make errors by encouraging them to produce 
names and/or actions quickly. It is worth noting that the deadline that Rumiati 
and Humphreys used was not a strict deadline; names that were said after 450 
ms were included in the analysis. Results showed that most of the naming errors 
that participants made were semantic in nature. The authors categorized an error 
as semantic when a participant confused an object with another one that is from 
the same functional category. For example, a participant might have confused a 
hammer with a saw; both objects are tools. Rumiati and Humphreys suggested 
that semantic errors prevailed in naming because access to semantics is required 




Humphreys, Price, and Riddoch (1999) suggested that there are three 
main stages during object naming.  First, when an object is seen, early visual 
processes encode the shape and other details of the object. This perceptual 
information then activates a structural description system. Essentially, structural 
description refers to visual representations of any object that is composed of 
parts and spatial relations among these parts (Farah, 1991). Second, the 
semantic system is accessed. The semantic system contains functional and 
associative knowledge about the object. Third, a phonological output is 
produced. Humphreys et al. (1999) explained that impairments at different 
stages of the naming process result in different types of errors. First, patients 
who are impaired with accessing the stored structural description system are 
impaired on object decision tasks, where discrimination between real objects 
and non-objects is required (Hillis & Caramazza, 1995). Usually, these patients 
are not impaired on high-level perceptual tasks, such as matching objects shown 
in unusual views (Gainotti & Silveri, 1996). This shows that these patients are 
impaired at accessing visual memory about the objects. Second, patients who 
are impaired with accessing the semantic system are not impaired on object 
decision tasks, but they are impaired on matching tasks, where participants must 
match one object to one of two other objects, one of which is semantically 
related to the first. For example, they would have to match a hammer to either a 
nail or screw. Usually these patients are not impaired on semantics tests from 
audition (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). This shows that these patients are 
impaired at accessing semantic knowledge from vision. Third, patients who are 
impaired with accessing the phonological output are not impaired on object 
decision and matching tasks, but are unable to name the object. Overall, 
evidence from both patients and healthy adults suggests that semantics plays an 
important role in naming objects; but what about the role of semantics in 




1.2 Producing Actions Associated with Objects 
1.2.1 Patients 
Similar to previous research that showed patients with optic aphasia and 
semantic dementia have difficulty in recognizing objects, research has shown 
that patients with apraxia have difficulty producing actions in response to 
objects.  Apraxia is defined as impairment in object use which cannot be 
explained on the basis of deficits in object recognition, comprehension, and 
basic motor control (Wheaton & Hallett, 2007). Buxbaum, Schwartz, Coslett, 
and Carew (1995) tested apraxic patient M.M., who had impairments in gesture 
pantomime and imitation. An assessment of gesture production showed that 
M.M.’s performance was normal when he used his right hand. However, when 
the researchers named an object to him or showed him the object itself, he was 
unable to demonstrate with his left hand how to use it. When the researchers 
allowed M.M. to hold the object and interact with it, his performance with his 
left hand improved. The authors then tested M.M.’s gesture imitation abilities 
and found that his performance improved when they allowed him to hold the 
object. Buxbaum et al. (1995) speculated that M.M. might have ideational 
apraxia, which is characterized by impairments in performing a complex 
sequence of actions with multiple objects. Therefore, they tested him on 
naturalistic actions with multiple objects.  For example, they asked him to make 
a single slice of toast with butter and jelly, which required him to use both of 
his hands at the same time. Results showed that he produced errors on multiple 
objects tasks with the left hand. For example, when they asked him to prepare 
and pack a lunch, he wiped up spilled mustard with tin foil instead of a paper 
towel using his left hand. However unlike in simple gesture tasks with no 
sequence of actions required, M.M.’s performance with his right hand was 




so as if it was an ice-pick and used it with a stabbing motion. More importantly, 
the pattern of errors for the left and the right hand were different. In essence, 
errors with the left hand involved substituting a conceptually related, but 
incorrect object (using tin foil instead of paper towel). On the other hand, errors 
with the right hand involved incorrect spatial orientation (wrongly grasping 
knife as an ice-pick). Then, the researchers asked M.M. to perform the actions 
using only one hand at a time, and found that performance with the left hand 
improved. Therefore, these results suggest that the errors for the left hand, at 
least, reflect the effects of impaired access to semantic memory since they 
involved substituting a conceptually related object. Hence, it seems that 
semantics play a role in producing actions with objects. 
To determine if semantic memory is important for the appropriate use of 
objects in routine skilled actions, Buxbaum, Schwartz, and Carew (1997) tested 
two patients. The first patient; D.M., had semantic dementia and the second 
patient; H.B., had Alzheimer’s disease.  Buxbaum et al. (1997) assessed both 
patients on the integrity of their semantic and action production abilities. An 
example of a semantic test was to point to an object; such as a light bulb, in 
order to pair it with one of five objects that is functionally associated with a 
target object; such as a lamp. Some examples of action tests were to use a 
pencil, prepare a slice of toast, and wrap a gift. Results showed that D.M. had 
impaired semantic knowledge. For example, he could not point to the correct 
object out of an array of five to pair it with a target object. However, he had no 
impairments in producing actions with objects. On the other hand, H.B. had no 
semantic impairments. However, he had impairments in producing actions with 
objects. For example, when the researchers asked H.B. to prepare a slice of 
toast, he sometimes omitted steps; such as not adding jelly on toast, or he 
sometimes added steps; such as wrapping toast in paper towel. On another 




error; such as closing the gift box before putting the gift inside the box or he 
made a semantic substitution error; such as wrapping the tissue paper around 
the box instead of around the gift. Buxbaum et al. (1997) argued that D.M.’s 
performance suggests that access to semantic memory for objects is not 
necessary for action production. On the other hand, they argued that H.B.’s 
performance suggests that access to semantic memory for objects is not 
sufficient for action production.  Therefore, it seems that semantics might not 
be needed to produce an action with an object.  
Similarly, the performance of visual apraxic patients also shows that 
semantics might not be necessary for action production.  Riddoch, Humphreys, 
and Price (1989) described visual apraxic patients as being impaired in 
gesturing to visually presented objects along with a relatively spared ability to 
name objects from vision. The researchers tested C.D., a visual apraxic patient, 
on his ability to access the semantic system. For example, they asked him to 
demonstrate which two of three pictures can be used to perform the same 
function. C.D.’s performance was normal indicating good visual access to 
semantics.  Then, they tested C.D. on his gesturing and naming abilities. They 
presented C.D. with an object, such as a pen, and asked him to use the object 
while holding it and then they asked him to name it. Results showed that C.D. 
was unable to produce correct gestures, but he was able to name the objects. 
Also, Riddoch et al. (1989) asked C.D. to use the items that were presented to 
him from before after providing him with their names. They found that C.D. 
was able to produce correct gestures.  Therefore, C.D. was able to gesture to 
command, but not to visually presented objects. The researchers suggested that 
C.D.’s impairment is due to damage to a possible direct route that exists 
between vision and the action system. Overall, the pattern of action errors of 
patients with apraxia shows that access to semantics is not sufficient and at the 




better picture on the role of semantics in producing actions, evidence from 
healthy adults needs to be discussed. 
1.2.2 Healthy Adults 
Similar to patients who have already a difficulty in producing actions in 
response to objects, healthy people can be induced to confuse actions associated 
with objects by the use of the deadline method. Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) 
asked healthy participants to make gestures in response to line drawings of 
objects under a deadline of 450 ms. Results showed that most of the action 
production errors that participants made were visual in nature. The authors 
categorized an error as visual when a participant confused an object with 
another one that is similar in shape. For example, a participant might have 
produced the action of a razor when presented with a hammer; both objects 
have similar structural representations. Rumiati and Humphreys suggested that 
visual errors arise in gesturing because action knowledge can be activated 
directly from the visual representations of objects and that the deadline prevents 
full activation of action responses. Therefore, the produced actions are based on 
incomplete activation of visual information shared by more than one object. 
Nonetheless, some of the action production errors that participants made were 
semantic in nature as well. The authors categorized an error as semantic when a 
participant confused an object with another one that is from the same functional 
category. For example, the participant might have produced the action of a saw 
when presented with a hammer; two tools. They suggested that these semantic 
errors arise because of a possible involvement of semantics in producing actions 
with objects. 
It seems that actions can be produced with or without access to 
semantics. It might be that in some circumstances, access to semantics is 
required to produce an action, while in other circumstances, it is not. Phillips, 




action retrieval from objects using positron emission topography (PET). In one 
experiment, they showed different participants words (names of objects) or line 
drawings of objects and non-objects. They asked the participants to press a key 
indicating whether the object would require a pouring or a twisting motion. An 
example of an object that could be used in a pouring action was a teapot. An 
example of an object that could be used in a twisting action was a key. In a 
second experiment, they showed different participants words (names of objects) 
or photographs of objects and non-objects (scrambled photographs) that either 
could be used in a pouring or twisting action. They asked participants to gesture 
a pouring or a twisting action using a manipulandum upon seeing each 
photograph. In both experiments, activation was seen in left inferior frontal, left 
posterior middle temporal and left anterior temporal cortices. All these areas, 
with the exception of the left posterior middle temporal cortex, are components 
of the semantic system (Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 
1996). The left posterior middle temporal cortex is an action specific area. 
Importantly, in comparison to semantic activation in response to words, there 
was decreased activation in the left anterior fusiform area; a semantic retrieval 
region, for photographs of real objects, and in the left anterior temporal cortex 
for photographs of non-objects in the first experiment and for photographs of 
real objects in the second experiment. In addition, actions to non-objects 
resulted in activation in an occipital-temporal region; not a semantically related 
region. These results show that different semantics areas are activated 
depending on the characteristics of the stimulus. In essence, words and 
photographs of real objects resulted in more activations of semantics areas, 
whereas, photographs of non-objects resulted in less activations of semantic 
areas. So far, the role of semantics in naming objects and producing actions 
with objects have been discussed separately, therefore, the following section 




influence of semantics in both naming objects and producing actions with 
objects.  
1.3 Naming and Action Model 
Yoon, Heinke, and Humphreys (2002) suggested a model for naming 
objects and producing their associated actions based on visual and semantic 
routes. The Naming and Action Model (NAM) explains how objects have 
access to naming via semantics and how objects have access to actions using an 
indirect route via semantics or using a direct visual route (Figure 1). According 
to the NAM, the structural description system is activated upon the visual 
presentation of an object. Within the structural description system, input units 
that encode the visual features of each segment of the object are activated, 
which then activates a radial basis function (RBF) network that highlights the 
structural similarity between objects. The output of the structural description 
system then activates the semantic system (Figure 1, route (a))  According to 
Yoon et al. (2002), the semantic system contains super-ordinate knowledge (for 
example, tools) as well as item-specific knowledge (for example, hammer). 
Then, the semantic system activates a phonological name output (Figure 1, 
route (b)) and an action output (Figure 1, route (d)). In addition, the output of 
the structural description system directly activates the action output without 
passing through the semantic system (Figure 1, route (c)).  Therefore, object 
similarity, object names, and action features associated with objects all form a 
semantic network where there is an interaction between object naming, action 
production, and action identification.  
According to the NAM (Yoon et al., 2002), naming substitution errors 
can arise from the confusion between two visually similar objects and/or two 
semantically similar objects. Similarly, action substitution errors can arise from 
the confusion between two visually similar actions and/or the confusion 




























Figure 1. Naming and Action Model. Reprinted from “Modelling Direct 
Perceptual Constraints on Action Selection: The Naming and Action Model 
(NAM),” by E. Y. Yoon, D. Heinke, and G. W. Humphreys, 2002, Visual 
Cognition, 9 (4/5), p. 624 (2002). Copyright 2002 by the Psychology Press Ltd. 




possible to determine if errors were based on visual or semantic similarity since 
common objects were used.  In order to observe the influence of semantic 
similarity in naming objects and producing actions, visual similarity should be 
held constant. The use of novel objects achieves this purpose. 
1.4 Novel Objects 
To try to study problems in object identification and usage, participants 
have been tested using common objects for which there already were long-
established connections to semantics and actions. This situation can create 
confounding factors. For example, when a person mistakenly identifies a saw as 
a knife, this confusion might be due to the fact that the knife and the saw are 
visually similar. However, the confusion between the knife and the saw might 
also arise because their actions are similar; both the knife and the saw are used 
in similar ways. In addition, this confusion could arise because of similar 
affordances; both the knife and the saw afford cutting. Humphreys (2001) 
described affordances as particular categories of action that may be activated 
directly by the visual representations of an object. Tucker and Ellis (1998) 
showed that seeing objects automatically primes components of actions they 
afford, even if a person has no intention of using the object. More specifically, 
they examined the relation between an object’s orientation and the hand most 
suited to perform a reach and grasp movement. They presented photographs of 
household objects to participants in two horizontal orientations; one orientation 
was compatible with a right hand grasp and the other orientation was 
compatible with a left hand grasp. Also, they presented objects to participants in 
two vertical orientations; one orientation was upright and the other orientation 
was inverted. The researchers asked the participants to decide as fast as possible 
whether each object was upright or inverted by making key presses. Results 
revealed that participants were faster and more accurate using their right hand 




grasp. Similarly, participants were faster and more accurate using their left hand 
when the object’s horizontal orientation was compatible with a left hand grasp. 
The authors concluded that there are existing action representations when 
people intend to perform an action, and when they perform the actual action, 
they select these representations.   
Because real objects have affordances and so are linked to particular 
actions, and in order to separately look at the impact of visual object similarity, 
action similarity and semantics on object naming and action production, one 
needs a set of objects and actions that are free of previous associations. In this 
way, the researcher can control visual and action similarity, and establish 
semantic representations for participants. Such objects and actions have been 
used by Desmarais, Pensa, Dixon and Roy (2007). Essentially, they used eight 
novel objects and asked participants to associate novel names and actions to 
them. Their results suggested that people often confuse actions that are visually 
similar, as well as actions that are associated with visually similar objects. The 
authors demonstrated this phenomenon by asking healthy participants to learn 
to identify and use eight novel objects that were each associated with one of 
eight novel actions. All participants received blocks of learning and testing 
trials.  During learning trials, they showed participants each object mounted on 
a manipulandum, a non-word label or “name” for that object, and an action that 
was performed with that object. For example, when a cucumber shaped object 
was shown, the label ‘yoot’ was shown, and the object was shown to be used in 
a particular way (e.g., pulled). During testing trials, each object was mounted on 
the manipulandum, and the researcher asked participants to name each object 
using its non-word label and then to either perform the action associated with it 
or to identify its action by selecting the correct action from a number of 
sequentially presented digital movie clips. It is important to note that the 




participants, action similarity and visual object similarity were aligned: similar 
actions were associated with similar objects and dissimilar actions were 
associated with dissimilar objects. For the other group of participants, action 
similarity and visual object similarity were misaligned: similar actions were 
associated with dissimilar objects and dissimilar actions were associated with 
similar objects. This allowed the authors to examine the impact of visual object 
similarity on action identification and action production. When participants 
produced an error, the authors noted which two actions had been confused. 
Their results suggested that action similarity played a role in action production; 
similar actions were confused more often than dissimilar actions. More 
interestingly visual object similarity also affected action errors where 
participants confused actions more often when they were associated with 
visually similar objects than when the same actions were associated with 
visually dissimilar objects. This study conclusively demonstrated that the visual 
characteristics of the objects influenced action identification and action 
production.  
Similarly, Desmarais, Dixon, and Roy (2007) used the same paradigm 
described above for naming objects. Their results showed that participants 
confused objects that were visually similar more often than objects that were 
visually dissimilar. Furthermore, participants confused similar objects more 
often when they were paired with similar actions than when they were paired 
with dissimilar actions. This study demonstrated that the similarity of the 
actions associated with objects influenced the pattern of errors observed when 
naming these objects. Overall, using novel objects enabled the decoupling of 
visual object and action similarity from one another (a situation that is 
impossible with common objects). 
It is clear from the above two studies that visual object similarity and 




producing actions with objects. However, in the above two studies, during test 
trials object naming was always done before action identification and 
production; participants were first asked what the object is called, and then 
asked what it does. Therefore, it could be argued that the previous studies with 
novel objects explored the indirect route of actions and not the direct route. This 
is because when naming objects first, access to semantics is required. So, from 
semantics, an action output is activated. Therefore, it is possible that naming 
objects before producing actions enhanced the impact of semantics on action 
production. Indeed, Desmarais, Pensa, Dixon & Roy (2007) showed that after 
an object naming error, people were more likely to produce the action 
associated with the wrong name more frequently than any other wrong action. 
Once an object is presented, an incorrect name can be followed by either the 
action associated with the incorrect name (1 possibility) or by another incorrect 
action (6 possibilities). Using a chi-square analysis, they found that participants 
were producing the action associated with the wrong name more frequently than 
predicted by chance. For example, if the object name was ‘fint’ and the 
participant called the object ‘baiv’, he/she performed the action that was 
associated with ‘baiv’ more frequently than predicted by chance.  This suggests 
that naming objects first may have enhanced the impact of semantic information 
on action production. Therefore, if actions were produced first, this might 
enhance the possibility of using the direct route to actions.  
Dabbagh, Desmarais, Roy and Dixon (2008 a & b) replicated the 
method of these novel object studies except they varied task order. Half of the 
participants named each object first, and then produced its associated action. 
The other half of participants produced the action associated with each object 
first, and then named the object. Results replicated previous findings: 
participants confused similar actions more often than dissimilar actions. Also, 




visually similar objects than when the same actions were associated with 
visually dissimilar objects. In addition, they expected that participants who 
named objects first would show a larger impact of semantic similarity on action 
production than participants who produced actions first. They expected this 
because according to the NAM (Yoon et al., 2002) names cannot be selected 
without accessing semantics, while actions can be selected without accessing 
semantics. However, this was not supported by Dabbagh et al.’s (2008 b) 
results. Interestingly, in the study, it was noted that some participants in the 
action first condition still named the objects first. This was evidenced from their 
verbalizations of the names even though they were encouraged to produce 
actions first. Hence, even for those in the action first condition who did not 
overtly name the objects, it is possible that they still covertly named the objects 
first.  Another drawback in the study was that semantic similarity was not 
manipulated since non-word labels were used. These non-word labels did not 
carry any semantic information with them. Also, there might be a possibility 
that the direct route (connection between structural description system and 
action output) to action production did not exist or was weakly established since 
the objects were novel and participants had no prior experience with them. In 
addition, when participants produced actions to objects, it was not possible to 
determine which route; direct or indirect, they took. They could have been 
thinking of the action first and then naming objects or they could have been 
naming objects first. All of these drawbacks will be explored further and dealt 
with in the current study. 
1.5 Current Study 
Past research has established that visual object similarity and action 
similarity drive confusions for object naming and action production. However, 
the role of semantics in naming and producing actions associated with novel 




names. The purpose of the current study is to show that when participants first 
learn new object-action associations, they produce actions through an indirect 
route to actions (via semantics), and that after training, they use a direct route to 
actions as a result of potentially enhancing the direct link between the structural 
features of objects and their actions. Therefore, participants learned labels and 
actions associated with novel objects in five sessions on five separate days, and 
in the process they had the chance to practice these actions. Schyns (as cited in 
Wallis & Bulthoff, 1999) said that in order to improve the representation of a 
response, adequate exposure is needed. Indeed, Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) 
showed that familiarity correlated with the total number of errors made on 
gesturing to each object. When making gestures in response to line drawings of 
objects under a deadline of 450 ms, participants produced fewer errors in 
response to line drawings of familiar objects than in response to line drawings 
of unfamiliar objects. Similarly, Bozeat, Ralph, Patterson, and Hodges (2002) 
showed that when patients with semantic dementia used objects, there was a 
significant association between object familiarity (as rated by spouse or 
caregiver) and correct object use. In essence, even though these patients could 
generally not use objects correctly, they could use some objects correctly if they 
were highly familiar with them. Bozeat et al. (2002) provided two possible 
mechanisms for this observation. First, repeated practice facilitates the 
production of actions by reinforcing conceptual representations. As a result, the 
semantic representations of objects are enhanced which allows the patients to 
use the indirect route to actions. Second, repeated practice can create automatic 
action responses when presented with a specific object. In other words, this 
mechanism reflects the involvement of the direct route to actions.  In addition, it 
could be that practice affects both mechanisms at the same time. Hence, 
according to the second mechanism, repeated practice might be required to 




participants in the current study practiced producing actions with objects so that 
they had the chance of strengthening this direct route to action production.  
A key question for this study is how much practice is needed.  Some 
insight to answering this question comes from a study by MacLeod and Dunbar 
(1988) who examined the effect of practice on enhancing the stroop effect 
interference in a novel task. The Stroop task usually involves a colour word (for 
example, red) that appears in coloured ink (Stroop, 1935).  In the first 
experiment, Stroop asked participants to read a list of colour names and 
measured their mean reaction times. There were two conditions: reading colour 
names printed in black and reading colour names where the colour of print and 
word were different (for example, red with green font colour). He found that 
there was no significant difference in mean reaction times between the two 
conditions. In the second experiment, Stroop asked participants to name the 
colour of the word and measured their mean reaction times. There were two 
conditions: naming the colour of solid squares and naming the colours words 
were printed in, where the colour of the print and the word were different. He 
found that participants took significantly longer time to name colours when the 
colour of the print and the word were different than when the colours appeared 
on solid squares. Essentially, the word interfered with naming the colour, but 
not vice versa.  
MacLeod and Dunbar (1988) adapted the stroop interference 
phenomenon by assigning colour names to unfamiliar shapes. Their aim was to 
determine if training could lead to interference in colour naming. They trained 
participants to associate four unfamiliar shapes with colour names. Then, they 
showed participants the shapes and asked them to name the colours when they 
appeared on shapes. They had congruent and incongruent trials. For congruent 
trials, each colour appeared on only the shape with the corresponding colour 




colour name, it appeared in the red colour name in these trials. For incongruent 
trials, each colour appeared on each shape except the one with the 
corresponding colour name (for example, if one of the shapes during training 
appeared in the red colour, it appeared in all the other colour names except red 
colour name in these trials). Also, they asked participants to name the shapes 
when they appeared in colour. Similarly, they had congruent and incongruent 
trials. They varied the amount of training. They trained different participants on 
naming each of the four shapes for 4 times for a total of 16 trials, 48 times for a 
total of 192 trials, 72 times for a total of 288 trials, and 144 times for a total of 
576 trials. Results after training revealed that when participants named shapes 
that appeared in colour, their mean reaction times were shorter for congruent 
trials than for incongruent trials. However, when participants named colours 
that appeared on shapes, their mean reaction times did not differ between 
congruent and incongruent trials. This pattern of results was the same across the 
different practice conditions. Therefore, shape identity did not interfere with 
colour naming for any of these training conditions. The authors speculated that 
this was probably due to the fact that participants needed more training sessions 
for the interference to occur. Therefore, they trained participants to practice 
naming each of the four shapes for 144 times for a total of 576 trials on each 
day for three days. Results showed that when participants named shapes that 
appeared in colour, their mean reaction times were shorter for congruent trials 
than for incongruent trials. Similarly, when participants named colours that 
appeared on shapes, their mean reaction times were shorter for congruent trials 
than for incongruent trials. Essentially, by training participants with enough 
practice sessions, the researchers induced interference in colour naming from 
shape identity.  
Based on these findings, participants in this study had a chance to 




is strengthened. Applying the same amount of practice as MacLeod and Dunbar 
(1988) would require 1,152 trials on each day, which would take about two 
hours each day. Having that many trials does not seem feasible given the 
potential time availability of the participants and the potential effects of fatigue. 
In this study, then, considering these factors participants practiced for seventy 
five blocks for each of the eight objects for a total of 600 trials each day for 
three days.  
Another drawback from the previous study by Dabbagh et al. (2008 a & 
b) was that when participants produced actions with novel objects, it was not 
possible to determine if they used the direct route or indirect route to action 
production because there was no way of testing this directly. However, Rumiati 
and Humphreys (1998) asked participants to gesture in response to words 
corresponding to objects. They observed that when they asked participants to 
gesture in response to words, the errors that participants produced were 
semantic in nature. The researchers concluded that a semantic route is used to 
gesture in response to words. Similarly, according to the NAM (Yoon et al., 
2002), producing actions in response to words requires access to semantics. 
Therefore, participants in this study produced actions with a cylinder 
approximating the size of the novel objects in response to their labels.  Asking 
participants to produce actions with another novel object that is not visually 
related to the previously learned objects will mimic gesturing in response to 
words in Rumiati and Humphreys’ (1998) study and will guarantee access to 
the indirect route to action production. Participants must produce the actions 
associated with the names of each of the previously learned novel objects by 
accessing the indirect route to action production as they will not have access to 
the visual representations of the objects.  This task then represents a more or 




Another purpose of the current study is to show that when naming novel 
objects, participants use semantics. Recall that in Dabbagh et al. (2008 a &b) 
semantic similarity was not manipulated since non-word labels were used. 
Therefore, in the current study, participants named objects using labels with 
meaningful semantic information. Dixon, Bub, and Arguin (1997) used this 
method and paired computer generated shapes with verbal labels that were 
either semantically similar (hammer, saw, wrench, and screwdriver) or 
semantically dissimilar (shark, rose, apple, and hummingbird). They presented 
E.L.M., a neurological patient, with sequences of interleaved learning trials 
where E.L.M. saw a shape and heard its name, and test trials where E.L.M. saw 
a shape and was asked to remember the shape’s name. Results showed that 
E.L.M. made more naming errors when shapes were paired with semantically 
similar labels than when the same shapes were paired with semantically 
dissimilar labels. Therefore, in this study, half of the objects were associated 
with semantically similar labels and the other half were associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels.  
In order to reduce the possibility of participants naming objects first 
when they are supposed to produce an action, participants in this study 
responded by a deadline following the method in the Rumiati and Humphreys’s 
(1998) study. Imposing a deadline should bias participants to use the most time 
efficient route to produce actions.  The Rumiati and Humphreys’ study used a 
deadline of 450 ms for participants to name objects and they used the same 
deadline for participants to produce actions with objects.  Since novel objects 
were used in this study, a 450 ms deadline would likely be too short.  The 
objects that were used in this study were novel and relatively more difficult to 
distinguish than known objects.  
Behavioural data provides some insight into the time that is required to 




(2006) asked participants to learn to name novel 2-D shapes similar to those 
used here with the labels of similar birds (e.g., robin, sparrow) and dissimilar 
birds (e.g., ostrich, penguin). After learning the shape-label associations, the 
researchers presented participants with a shape and a cross at one of the four 
corners of the screen. In half of the trials, the vertical arm of the cross was 
longer, and in the other half the horizontal arm was longer.  Participants named 
the shape as fast as possible, and indicated which arm of the cross was longer. 
Results revealed that participants named novel shapes associated with the 
names of similar birds in about 1200 ms. On the other hand; participants named 
novel shapes associated with the names of dissimilar birds in about 1100 ms. 
The reaction times in the study were for naming 2-D shapes presented on a 
computer screen. The objects that were used in this study have a similar 
structure, but are 3-D, where participants named and produced actions with the 
actual objects. Therefore a deadline of 1200 ms for executing actions and 
naming these objects would seem appropriate.  
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the nature of errors in object 
naming and producing actions in response to novel objects before and after 
practicing object-action associations. Since half of the objects were associated 
with semantically similar labels and the other half were associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels, there were four types of confusions that a 
participant could make: 
1- Confusing an object associated with a semantically similar label with 
another object associated with a semantically similar label (similar 
confusion). 
2- Confusing an object associated with a semantically similar label with 
another object associated with a semantically dissimilar label. 
3- Confusing an object associated with a semantically dissimilar label 




4- Confusing an object associated with a semantically dissimilar label 
with another object associated with a semantically dissimilar labels 
(dissimilar confusion).  
The current study focused on comparing confusions between two novel 
objects associated with the names of similar labels and confusions between two 
objects associated with the names of two dissimilar labels (first and fourth type 
of confusions). The following is a summary of predicted data for the three 
deadline conditions before and after practice.   
Naming Errors: 
Before practice, it is expected that participants will confuse novel 
objects associated with the names of similar labels more often than novel 
objects associated with the names of dissimilar labels.  After practice, there will 
be an overall drop in errors. However, the pattern will stay the same before and 
after practice. Participants will still confuse novel objects associated with the 
names of similar labels more often than novel objects associated with the names 
of dissimilar labels. This is because naming requires access to semantics. 
Action Errors: 
Object Condition: Before practice, it is expected that participants will 
confuse actions associated with the names of similar labels more often than 
actions associated with the names of dissimilar labels. This is because 
participants will likely take the indirect route to action production via semantics 
since the direct route to action production is probably weak. After practice, 
there will be an overall drop in errors as predicted for the naming condition. 
However, in contrast to naming, there will be an equivalent number of 
confusions between actions associated with the names of similar labels and 
between actions associated with the names of dissimilar labels. This contrasting 




production due to the extended practice in performing the actions linked to 
these novel objects. 
Cylinder Condition: Before practice, it is expected that participants will 
confuse actions associated with the names of similar labels more often than 
actions associated with the names of dissimilar labels. After practice, there will 
be an overall drop in errors. However, unlike the novel object condition, the 
pattern will stay the same before and after practice. Essentially, practicing the 
actions associated with the novel objects should not affect performance in this 
condition. Because participants will produce actions with the cylinder, they will 
have to access semantics using the labels associated with the novel objects since 












Ten right-handed undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Waterloo (4 males, 6 females) with an average age of 22.3 years 
old participated in the study. Because participants were required to learn 
English words as labels, participants were excluded if English was not their first 
language. On average, it took seven hours for participants to finish the five 
sessions of the study.  
2.2 Materials 
Eight novel graspable objects (see Desmarais, Dixon, and Roy, 2007) 
having different combinations of curvature, tapering, and thickness were used. 
The objects form a three-dimensional space. Cartesian coordinates describe the 
position of each object in the space (Figure 2). For example, the object in 
position (0,0,0) is the ‘origin object’, which is basically a cucumber shaped 
object. All other objects involve modifications of this origin object. In this 
space, some objects are closer together than other objects. The distance between 
two objects can be interpreted as city-block (CB) distance. A city-block 
distance represents the sum of the distances obtained separately on each 
dimension. It follows then that the number of distinctive characteristics equals 
the number of visual CBs (VCBs) that separate two objects. For example, 
objects (0,0,0) and (0,0,1) are one VCB apart, whereas objects (0,0,0) and 
(1,0,1) are two VCBs apart, and objects (0,0,0) and (1,1,1) are three VCBs 
apart. Objects that are closer together are visually more similar than objects that 
are not as close.   
Each of these objects was associated with one of eight actions that are 






















Figure 2. Three-dimensional object space. Reprinted from “A Role for Action 
Knowledge in Visual Object Identification,” by G. Desmarais, M. J. Dixon, and 
E. A. Roy, 2007, Memory and Cognition, 35 (7), p. 1713, Copyright 2007 by 












(see Desmarais, Dixon, and Roy, 2007). Similar to the object space, these 
actions form a three-dimensional space. Cartesian coordinates describe the 
position of each action in the space (Figure 3). For example, the action in 
position (0,0,0) is called the ‘origin action’, which is basically grasping an 
object. All other actions involve modifications of this origin action. Similar to 
the object space, some actions are closer together than other actions, and the 
distance between two actions can be interpreted as city-block (CB) distance The 
number of distinctive characteristics equals the number of action CBs (ACBs) 
that separate two actions. For example, actions (0,0,0) and (0,0,1) are one ACB 
apart, whereas actions (0,0,0) and (1,0,1) are two ACBs apart, and actions 
(0,0,0) and (1,1,1) are three ACBs apart. Actions that are closer together are 
visually more similar than actions that are not as close. 
Objects were mounted onto a manipulandum (Figure 4) that allowed 
users to move the object by sliding it 6 cm leftwards, pulling it out by 12 cm, or 
rotating it leftwards so that the top portion of the hand covered a 6 cm distance. 
There were two manipulandi used; one was placed in front of the participant 
and the other one was placed in front of the researcher. In addition, a modified 
manipulandum was used during practice sessions, where all eight objects were 
mounted on it (Figure 5). This modified manipulandum allowed users to move 
each object the same distances as the original manipulandum.  
Another novel object, a cylinder, was used (Figure 6). The cylinder was 
approximately the same size as the eight novel objects. Also, PLATO liquid 
crystal glasses were worn by participants. These glasses can be instantaneously 
switched from clear to opaque to prevent vision between trials. When the 
glasses are opaque the light reaches the eye but vision is prevented. When the 
glasses are clear the environment is fully visible. This ensured that the 
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Figure 3. Three-dimensional action space. Reprinted from “A Role for Action 
Knowledge in Visual Object Identification,” by G. Desmarais, M. J. Dixon, and 
E. A. Roy, 2007, Memory and Cognition, 35 (7), p. 1715, Copyright 2007 by 




















































































switching of the glasses from clear to opaque served as the deadline that 
participants were encouraged to respond by.   
Eight labels were used as the names of the eight objects. Four of the 
labels were semantically similar [robin (2, 5.95), crow (3, 5.00), sparrow (1, 
4.35), chickadee (1, 3.80)] and the other four were semantically dissimilar [milk 
(49,-), guitar (22, 6.15), sweater (18, 8.45), sand (29,-)]. The first number 
between brackets corresponds to the Kucera and Francis (1967) frequency and 
the second number corresponds to familiarity ratings (McRae, K., n.d.). 
However, the frequencies for ‘milk’ and ‘sand’ correspond to the MRC 
psycholinguistic database (Wilson, 1988). The mean frequency for the 
semantically similar labels is 1.75 and for the semantically dissimilar labels is 
29.5; t (6) = - 4.020, p = 0.007. Since the semantically similar labels have lower 
mean frequency than the semantically dissimilar labels, then this potentially 
enhances the effect of semantic similarity on object naming and action 
production. This is because it will be more likely to produce more errors for 
objects associated with semantically similar labels than objects associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels. Therefore, for the three tasks in this study, there 
might be an enhancement of the differences between semantically similar and 
semantically dissimilar labels. However, this will provide a stronger test for the 
effect of semantic similarity on producing actions with novel objects after 
practice. It is expected that in this task, participants will make equivalent 
number of errors for objects associated with semantically similar labels and 
objects associated with semantically dissimilar labels. Therefore, if this 
prediction holds then that shows that practicing object-action associations had 
such a strong influence on decreasing the influence of semantic similarity on 
action production with novel objects after practice such that there was no 
influence of frequency. In essence, this difference in the mean frequencies will 




associated with semantically similar labels and objects associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels. The mean familiarity for the semantically similar 
labels is 4.8 and for the semantically dissimilar labels is 7.3; t (4) = - 2.555, p = 
0.063. The associations between novel objects, actions, and labels were 
counterbalanced between participants (see Table 1 in the Appendix A).  
It is important to note that for every two participants, the action 
associations with the novel objects were the same and the order of testing 
conditions on the first and the last session was the same. The only difference 
between these two participants was that the objects that were associated with 
semantically similar labels for one participant; were the same objects that were 
associated with semantically dissimilar labels for the other participant. This 
controlled for visual object and action similarity and ensured that any 
differences found between the two conditions will result from differences in 
associating the novel objects with similar versus dissimilar labels. 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were asked to learn the labels and actions associated with 
each novel object. Participants completed one session per day on each of five 
separate consecutive days, except for one participant who did the third and the 
fourth session on the same day.  
2.3.1 Day 1 and Day 5 
Introduction to objects, names and actions: 
Because there were eight different labels, the researcher asked 
participants to memorize them before being presented with objects and their 
associated labels and actions. The researcher read the list of eight labels, and 
asked the participants to recall as many as they could in any order. After that, 
the researcher read the list again and the participants recalled the labels. This 




row. This ensured that errors produced later on were due to confusion with 
regard to semantic similarity and not simply due to not remembering a label. 
Next, participants learned to associate each novel object with a name and an 
action.  This learning process involved a series of interleaved binding and 
testing trials. 
Binding Trials:  At the beginning of each trial, participants’ vision was 
occluded using PLATO liquid crystal glasses. With glasses opaque, one object 
was mounted by the researcher on to the participants’ manipulandum and 
another identical object on to the researcher’s manipulandum. The researcher 
then pressed a button that made the goggles transparent, said the object’s label, 
and demonstrated how to use the object mounted on the manipulandum in front 
of her. The researcher instructed participants to listen to the label and watch the 
action and to remember both.  The researcher then pressed a button to occlude 
vision with the PLATO liquid crystal glasses and mounted the next object on 
the manipulandi. This sequence continued until all eight objects, labels, and 
actions were presented once in random order.  
Testing Trials: At the beginning of each trial, participants’ vision was 
occluded. During this time, the researcher mounted an object onto the 
manipulandum in front of the participants. The researcher then pressed a button 
that made the goggles transparent, and asked the participants to say the name of 
the object and to produce its associated action. After the participants responded, 
the researcher pressed a button to occlude vision with the PLATO liquid crystal 
glasses and mounted the next object on the manipulandum. The researcher 
presented participants with each of the eight novel objects, one at a time.  The 
participants’ naming and action responses on each testing trial were recorded. 
No feedback was provided to the participants. 
After eight of these testing trials, one for each object, participants 




interleaving of eight binding and testing trials continued until participants 
correctly labelled all eight objects and correctly produced all eight actions twice 
in a row.  
Naming and producing actions to a deadline: 
 The next part of the session involved three tasks: (1) naming objects (2) 
producing actions with objects (3) producing actions with a cylinder. All three 
tasks were preformed under a deadline.  The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced between participants (see Table 2 in Appendix A).  
Naming Objects (testing trials): At the beginning of each trial, 
participants’ vision was occluded. During this time, the researcher mounted one 
of the objects onto the manipulandum in front of the participants. Then, the 
researcher pressed a button that made the goggles transparent. After 1200 ms, 
the glasses automatically became occluded. So, the researcher asked the 
participants to try saying the label of the object before 1200 ms and encouraged 
them to say the first label that came to their mind. Then, the researcher mounted 
the next object onto the manipulandum and pressed a button that made the 
glasses transparent. Participants were presented with each of the eight novel 
objects, one at a time.  There were fifteen blocks of these trials for a total of 120 
trials. No feedback was provided to the participants. However, every five 
blocks, participants received a reminder block where the researcher mounted 
each object on the manipulandum and named it. 
Actions with novel objects (testing trials): At the beginning of each trial, 
participants’ vision was occluded. During this time, the researcher mounted an 
object onto the manipulandum in front of the participants. Then, the researcher 
pressed a button that made the glasses transparent. The participants’ right hand 
was always located approximately five centimetres to the right of the 
manipulandum. After 1200 ms, the goggles automatically became occluded. So, 




the object before 1200 ms and encouraged them to produce the first action that 
came to their mind. Then, the researcher mounted the next object onto the 
manipulandum and pressed a button that made the glasses transparent. 
Participants were presented with each of the eight novel objects, one at a time.  
There were fifteen blocks of these trials for a total of 120 trials. No feedback 
was provided to the participants. However, every five blocks, participants 
received a reminder block where the researcher mounted each object on the 
manipulandum and produced its associated action. 
Actions with a cylinder (testing trials): At the beginning of each trial, 
participants’ vision was occluded. Then, the researcher mounted a cylinder onto 
the manipulandum in front of the participants. The participants’ right hand was 
always located approximately five centimetres to the right of the 
manipulandum. After that, the researcher pressed a button that made the glasses 
transparent and said the label of one of the objects. After 1200 ms, the glasses 
automatically became occluded. So, the researcher asked the participants to try 
producing the action on the cylinder that was associated with the novel object 
corresponding to the given label before 1200 ms and encouraged them to 
produce the first action that came to their mind. Then, the researcher pressed a 
button that made the goggles transparent once again and said the next label of 
the object. Participants were given the labels with each of the eight novel 
objects, one at a time. There were fifteen blocks of these trials for a total of 120 
trials. No feedback was provided to participants. However, every five blocks, 
participants received a reminder block where the researcher mounted the 
cylinder on the manipulandum in front of her, said the label of one of the 
previously learned novel objects and then produced its associated action.  
2.3.2 Days 2, 3, 4 
On days 2, 3, and 4, participants practiced producing the actions that 




were given a block of reminder trials, where the researcher mounted each of the 
eight novel objects on the manipulandum placed in front of her, and showed 
their associated actions. One novel object was shown at a time. After the block 
of the reminder trials, the researcher pointed to one of the objects on the 
modified manipulandum placed in front of the participants and asked them to 
show its associated action. The physical location of the objects was different for 
the three practice sessions (see Table 3 in Appendix A). This was done so that 
participants did not become accustomed to associate an object with a specific 
location on the modified manipulandum. When participants made a mistake, the 
researcher informed them that a mistake was done and asked them to attempt to 
produce the correct action again. Participants practiced for 75 blocks for each of 
the eight objects for a total of 600 trials each day excluding the block of 



















3.1 Data Analysis 
When participants said a wrong label, the researcher coded which two 
labels were confused. For example, if the objects’ label was ‘robin’ and the 
participant said ‘crow’; the researcher coded this error as confusion between 
semantically similar labels.  On the other hand, if the objects’ label was ‘milk’ 
and the participant said ‘sand’; the researcher coded this error as confusion 
between semantically dissimilar labels. Also, when participants produced a 
wrong action with the novel objects and with the cylinder, the researcher coded 
which two actions were confused. For example, if the object’s action was 
associated with a semantically similar label (such as robin) and the participant 
produced incorrect action of another object associated with a semantically 
similar label (such as crow); the researcher coded this error as confusion 
between actions associated with semantically similar labels. On the other hand, 
if the object’s action was associated with a semantically dissimilar label (such 
as milk) and the participant produced incorrect action of another object 
associated with a semantically dissimilar label (such as sand); the researcher 
coded this error as confusion between actions associated with semantically 
dissimilar labels. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted since each 
participant participated in all of the different conditions of the study for the 
factors of condition, time, and type of confusion. An alpha level of 0.05 was 
used. In addition, a series of planned comparisons of one tailed paired t-tests 
were used in order to compare the impact of semantic similarity on the three 





As a first step, an analysis was performed on blocks to criterion for 
naming objects and producing actions with objects in order to compare the level 
of difficulties of the two tasks. Also, this analysis was performed in order to see 
if introducing these object-label-action associations again after practice served 
only as a reminder. That is, participants did not need to relearn the associations 
again. A 2 task (naming, actions) x 2 practice (before, after) ANOVA was 
performed. Results showed no main effect of task; F (1,9) = 2.647, p = 0.138. 
This means that the two tasks were comparable in difficulty. There was a main 
effect of practice; F (1,9) = 38.157, p < 0.001. In general, after practice (mean = 
2, SD = 0), participants took less number of blocks to name objects and produce 
their associated actions correctly twice in a row compared to before practice 
(mean = 5.55, SD = 1.82). The significance of a main effect of practice is not 
surprising. Before practice, participants performed the tasks with no prior 
exposure. On the other hand, after practice, participants performed the tasks 
after they had already learned object-label-action associations. Indeed, after 
practice, participants did not need to relearn the object-label-action associations. 
It is interesting to note that during practice days, participants made very few 
action errors with novel objects. Participants’ overall error rates were 0.62 % on 
the first day of practice, 0.65 % on the second day of practice, and 0.48 % 
errors on the third day of practice.  
Next, an analysis was conducted for the three deadline tasks. A 3 task 
(naming, actions with novel objects, and actions with cylinder) x 2 time (before 




measures ANOVA was conducted1. The analysis showed a main effect of time; 
F (1,9) = 89.934, p < 0.001. Generally, participants made more errors before 
practice (mean = 6.35, SD = 2.02) than after practice (mean = 3.267, SD = 
1.41). Also, there was a main effect of confusion; F (1,9) = 34.972, p < 0.001, 
which means participants made more similar confusions (mean = 6.033, SD = 
2.15) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 3.583, SD = 1.34). Also, there was an 
interaction between task and time; F (2,18) = 9.783, p = 0.001. In addition, 
there was an interaction between time and semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 20.242, 
p =0.001. Most importantly, there was an interaction between task, time and 
semantic similarity; F (2,18) = 7.133, p = 0.005, which was expected.  
 In order to determine the source of the three way interaction, a separate 
2 time (before practice, after practice) x 2 semantic similarity (similar, 
dissimilar) repeated measures ANOVA for each task was performed. The task 
of naming was first analyzed (Figure 7). The analysis revealed a main effect of 
time; F (1,9) = 10.917, p = 0.009. Participants produced more naming errors 
before practice (mean = 5.7, SD = 2.60) than after practice (mean = 4.35, SD = 
2.11). There was a main effect of semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 22.224, p = 
0.001. Participants made more naming errors for similar confusions (mean = 
6.4, SD = 2.68) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 3.65, SD = 2.20). However, 
there was no interaction; F (1,9) = 1.976, p = 0.193. Next, the task of actions 
with the cylinder was analyzed (Figure 8). Again, the analysis revealed a main 
effect of time; F (1,9) = 29.16, p < 0.001. Participants produced more action 
errors before practice (mean = 5.35, SD =1.31) than after practice (mean = 3.1, 
SD = 1.61). There was also a main effect of semantic similarity; F (1,9) =  
                                                     
 
1 It is worth noting that the analysis was repeated without the data from the participant 
who finished the third and fourth sessions on the same day and the pattern of results remained 
































Similar Confusions Dissimilar Confusions
 
Figure 7. Mean number of naming novel objects errors to type of confusion as a 







































Similar Confusions Dissimilar Confusions
 
Figure 8. Mean number of actions with cylinder errors with to type of 















52.123, p < 0.001. Participants made more action errors for similar confusions 
(mean = 5.65, SD = 1.63) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 2.8, SD = 1.25). 
However, there was no interaction; F (1,9) = 0.088, p = 0.774. Finally, the task 
of actions with the novel objects was analyzed (Figure 9). Again, the analysis 
revealed a main effect of time; F (1,9) = 31.051, p < 0.001. Participants 
produced more action errors before practice (mean = 8.0, SD = 3.43) than after 
practice (mean = 2.35, SD = 0.97). There was also a main effect of semantic 
similarity; F (1,9) = 10.97, p = 0.009. Participants made more action errors for 
similar confusions (mean = 6.05, SD = 2.64) than dissimilar confusions (mean 
= 4.3, SD = 1.47). However, there was an interaction between time and 
semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 21.0, p = 0.001. When participants produced 
actions before practice, they made more errors for similar confusions (mean = 
10.1, SD = 4.91) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 5.9, SD = 2.18); t (9) = 
4.075, p = 0.001. However, when participants produced actions after practice, 
they no longer made more errors for similar confusions (mean = 2.0, SD = 0.94) 
than dissimilar confusions (mean = 2.7, SD = 1.16); t (9) = - 2.689, ns (one-
tailed test). In summary, the three way interaction arises from the significant 
interaction between time and semantic similarity for the task of producing 
actions with the novel objects, while this interaction is not significant for 
naming objects and producing actions with the cylinder in response to object 
labels. 
It is important to note that the results of the above analysis compared 
confusions between two different sets of actions. So, for the three tasks, it 
compared confusions between objects or actions associated with semantically 
similar labels and objects associated with semantically dissimilar labels. For 
example, a similar confusion between robin and chickadee is at the same time 
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Figure 9. Mean number of actions with novel objects errors to type of 














milk and guitar is at the same time confusion between actions of slide and slide 
and twist. In essence, similar and dissimilar confusions involve different 
actions. Another way of testing the influence of semantic similarity on action 
production is to compare confusions between the same set of actions. Therefore, 
for the three tasks, this second analysis compared how often participants 
confused objects associated with semantically similar labels to (a) other objects 
associated with semantically similar labels versus (b) objects associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels. For example, a similar confusion between robin 
and chickadee is at the same time confusion between actions of hold and pull. 
But, now a dissimilar confusion between robin and milk is at the same time 
confusion between hold and slide. In essence, similar and dissimilar confusions 
involve the common action of hold. Results of this second analysis showed 
similar pattern of results for the three tasks (for more details, please see 
Appendix B). The fact that both analyses showed similar results provides a 











 One of the aims of this study was to show that practicing actions with 
the novel objects will decrease the reliance on semantics when producing these 
actions. Another aim of the study was to show that naming novel objects and 
producing actions with the cylinder will rely heavily on semantics both before 
and after practicing object-action associations. The results of this study fit well 
with the three predictions for naming errors and action errors with the cylinder 
and with the novel objects. Results showed that when naming objects, 
participants confused objects associated with semantically similar labels more 
often than objects associated with semantically dissimilar labels. This pattern 
was the same before and after practice. Similarly, when producing actions with 
the cylinder, participants confused actions associated with semantically similar 
labels more often than actions associated with semantically dissimilar labels. 
This pattern was the same before and after practice. Importantly, when 
producing actions with the novel objects before practice, participants confused 
actions associated with semantically similar labels more often than actions 
associated with semantically dissimilar labels. However, after practice, 
participants did not confuse actions associated with semantically similar labels 
more often than actions associated with semantically dissimilar labels. Overall, 
the results of the current study are in agreement with its two aims. 
4.1 Naming and Producing Actions with Novel Objects 
The results of this study are in line with the predictions from the 
Naming and Action Model; NAM (Yoon et al., 2002), that was explained 
earlier. According to the NAM, when naming objects, access to semantics is 
required. However actions can be produced with access to semantics; through 
the indirect route, or without access to semantics; through the direct route. In 




(bird) labels and dissimilar (non-bird) labels. For the task of naming objects; 
both before and after practice, participants confused objects associated with 
semantically similar labels more often than objects associated with semantically 
dissimilar labels. According to the NAM, the only way to name objects is by 
accessing semantics, so this means that participants in this study were using 
semantics when naming objects. For the task of producing actions with the 
cylinder; both before and after practice, participants confused actions associated 
with semantically similar labels more often than actions associated with 
semantically dissimilar labels. According to the NAM, the only way to produce 
an action in response to its name is by accessing semantics, so this means that 
participants were using semantics (indirect route to action production) when 
producing actions with the cylinder. For the task of producing actions with the 
novel objects; before practice, participants confused actions associated with 
semantically similar labels more often than actions associated with semantically 
dissimilar labels. This suggests that participants seemed to be using the indirect 
route to action production when producing actions with the novel objects before 
practice. On the other hand, after practice, participants did not confuse actions 
associated with semantically similar labels more often than actions associated 
with semantically dissimilar labels. This suggests that participants seemed to be 
using the direct route to action production when producing actions with the 
novel objects after practice.  Overall, the pattern of results suggests that 
semantic similarity influenced the tasks of naming objects and producing 
actions with the cylinder both before and after practice. However, semantic 
similarity influenced the task of producing actions with the novel objects before 
practice but not after practice.  
The observation that semantic similarity influenced naming objects both 
before and after practice confirms the findings by Rumiati and Humphreys 




found that most of the naming errors produced were semantic in nature and 
concluded that naming objects requires access to semantics. Similarly, the 
pattern of results for naming novel objects in this study confirms the 
conclusions that were drawn by Hillis and Caramazza (1995) who tested a 
patient with optic aphasia, and Hodges et al. (2000) who tested nine patients 
with semantic dementia. They found that patients were impaired at naming line 
drawings of objects, and that most of the errors were semantic in nature. 
Overall, the pattern of results observed in the naming task confirms the notion 
that access to semantics is required when naming objects: participants 
consistently confused objects associated with semantically similar labels more 
often than objects associated with semantically dissimilar labels. 
The observation that semantic similarity influenced producing actions 
with the cylinder both before and after practice confirms the findings by 
Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) who asked participants to gesture in response to 
words corresponding to objects. They showed that all of the errors were 
semantic in nature. The researchers concluded that a semantic route is used to 
gesture in response to words. In this study, the pattern of results observed when 
producing actions with the cylinder confirms the notion that access to semantics 
is required when producing actions in response to words. This result 
demonstrated that participants could not access the direct route to action 
production since the cylinder was not visually related to the previously learned 
novel objects. Overall, the results of this study suggest that participants were 
using the indirect route to action production when producing actions with the 
cylinder: participants consistently confused actions associated with semantically 
similar labels more often than actions associated with semantically dissimilar 
labels. 
The observation that semantic similarity influenced action production 




(1995) who tested apraxic patient M.M. on gesture production. They showed 
that M.M. made errors with his left hand that involved substituting a 
conceptually related, but incorrect object. They concluded that semantics might 
play a role in action production. In this study, the pattern of results observed 
when producing actions with the novel objects before practice confirms the 
notion that actions are hugely influenced by semantics and participants were 
likely using the indirect route to action production: participants consistently 
confused actions associated with semantically similar labels more often than 
actions associated with semantically dissimilar labels. The observation that 
semantic similarity did not influence action production with the novel objects 
after practice confirms the findings by Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) who 
asked healthy participants to make gestures in response to line drawings of 
objects. They found that most of the action production errors were visual in 
nature. In this study, the pattern of results observed when producing actions 
with the novel objects after practice confirms the notion that actions are not 
hugely influenced by semantics and participants were likely using the direct 
route to action production: participants did not confuse actions associated with 
semantically similar labels more often than actions associated with semantically 
dissimilar labels. Overall, the results of this study suggest that when learning 
novel actions, semantics is involved heavily. On the other hand, when 
producing well-learned actions, the involvement of semantics diminishes.  
4.2 Need for Practice to Develop Direct Route to Actions 
The fact that participants were not influenced by semantic similarity 
when producing actions with novel objects after practice compared to before 
practice sheds light on the study by Bozeat et al. (2002). When they tested 
patients with semantic dementia on using objects, they found a correlation 
between correct object use and the familiarity of the object. Patients who are 




them and so they can correctly demonstrate the use of these objects. Bozeat et 
al. (2002) provided two possible mechanisms for this observation. The first one 
deals with the role of repeated practice in strengthening degraded semantic 
representations. In other words, this mechanism strengthens the indirect route to 
action production. The second mechanism deals with the role of repeated 
practice in creating automatic action responses when presented with an object. 
In other words, this mechanism reflects the involvement of the direct route to 
action production. Indeed, the results of the current study showed that repeated 
practice seems to strengthen the direct route to action production since 
participants were not affected by the semantic similarity after practice 
compared to before practice when producing actions with novel objects. 
However, it is important to note that the current study did not deal with the first 
mechanism, so it is still possible that repeated practice might have a role in 
strengthening semantic representations as well. To confirm this possibility, 
neurological patients with semantic impairments need to be tested. In general, 
the results of this current study suggest that repeated practice strengthened the 
direct link between representations of objects in the structural description 
system and their action outputs.  
4.3 Interaction between Two Routes to Action Production 
Even though the Naming and Action Model; NAM (Yoon et al., 2002) 
suggests that there are two routes to action production, it is important to 
emphasize that these two routes are not dissociated.  Indeed, Yoon et al. (2002) 
proposed a convergence of the two routes for action production. They suggested 
that separate semantic and visual representations converge to guide action 
selection in response to visually presented objects. The idea of the interaction 
between the two routes to action production is even more supported by their 
proposal that a lesion to one route blocks access to the second route. If the two 




affect the second route. So, if the two routes are dissociated, then, it is expected 
that patients with a lesion to the direct route should be able to produce actions 
through the indirect route to action production. However, Chainay and 
Humhreys (2002 a) showed that impaired visual knowledge about objects 
hinders the performance of action production. They presented apraxic patients 
with photographs of objects, non-objects (formed from parts of two objects), 
action part of objects, and non-action part of objects. They asked the patients to 
gesture in response to these photographs. Results revealed that patients gestured 
correctly in response to photographs of objects more than in response to 
photographs of non-action part of objects. The authors argued that non-action 
part of objects is equivalent to an impaired visual knowledge about objects. So, 
participants could not produce as many correct gestures as they did in response 
to photographs of objects because the impaired direct route to action production 
blocked the access to the indirect route to action production via semantics. 
Therefore, the results of the current study suggest that when learning novel 
actions, the indirect route to action production via semantics is used. On the 
other hand, after repeated practice of producing actions with objects, the direct 
route to action production dominates the activity of the indirect route to action 
production. This means that actions are not produced only via the direct route to 
action production. 
In addition to proposing the two routes to action production, Yoon et al. 
(2002) acknowledged that the direct route might be more dominant than the 
semantic route since it is faster; it bypasses the semantic system. Indeed, 
Chainay and Humphreys (2002 b) showed that participants made faster action 
decisions in response to objects than to words. They showed participants words 
and line drawings of known objects and asked them to make action decisions as 
to whether pouring or twisting was associated with the words and the objects. In 




horizontally to represent a twisting action and vertically to represent a pouring 
action. Results showed that participants produced actions in response to words 
in 1,174 ms, while they produced actions in response to objects in 1, 052 ms. 
Producing actions in response to words is similar to producing actions with the 
cylinder in response labels in the current study. So, this corresponds to using the 
indirect route to action production. Also, producing actions in response to 
objects is similar to producing actions with the novel objects after practice in 
the current study. So, this corresponds to using the direct route to action 
production. Although the current study did not look at reaction time data, it 
seems that producing actions via the direct route is faster than producing actions 
via the indirect route. In essence, after practice, participants produced actions 
with the novel objects via the most time efficient route; namely the direct route. 
Therefore, participants were able to produce actions with the novel objects 
before semantic activity could interfere.  
4.4 Role of Semantics in Action Preparation and Production 
So far, it is clear that the two routes to action production are connected. 
However, one might wonder about the specific role of semantics in action 
preparation and production. Glover and Dixon (2002) showed that when 
grasping an object, semantics affect the planning process, but not the online 
control process. Participants sat in front of a mirror that allowed them to see a 
table with a target object. This was done in order to control the visibility of the 
target object on the table. There were three different sizes of target objects and 
they had either ‘large’ or ‘small’ labels written on them. Participants were 
instructed to reach out and grasp each object and to ignore the label. The 
researchers measured grip aperture during the reaching movement. Results 
demonstrated that there was a varied effect of words on grip aperture. More 
specifically, semantics affected planning the reaching and grasping components 




had a ‘large’ label, participants would start to have a larger grip aperture than 
what was required. However, participants gradually would change their grip 
aperture to match the size of the object. The authors suggested that on-line 
control corrected the semantic effect during planning. In the current study, 
although semantics might have influenced producing actions with the novel 
objects after practice, it was not possible to show this minor influence of 
semantics. This is because the set up of the current study did not allow for 
testing the influence of semantics during action planning and action production 
separately. The pattern of results of the current study points to influence of 
semantics or no influence of semantics. 
van Elk, van Schie, and Bekkering (2008) showed a modulation of 
semantic activation when preparing for action production. They asked 
participants to sit in front of a computer screen with a magnifying glass on one 
side of the table and a cylinder on the other side. At the beginning of each trial, 
participants pressed a start button, and a picture of one of the two objects was 
shown on the computer screen to indicate which object they would perform the 
action with. After that, a word was presented and participants had to decide 
whether the word represented a body part or an animal by lifting their index or 
middle finger. In separate blocks, participants were asked to grasp the object to 
perform meaningful or meaningless action. An example of a meaningful action 
was to bring the cup to the mouth. An example of a meaningless action was to 
bring the cup to the eye. The authors analyzed the N400 component (300-500 
ms) after the presentation of the word. Results showed that when participants 
prepared a meaningful action, words that were incongruent with the action goal 
caused a larger semantic activation than words that were congruent with the 
action goal. For example, when they were instructed to bring a cup to their 
mouth, the presentation of the word ‘eye’ caused a larger semantic activation 




prepared a meaningless action, there was no difference in the semantic 
activation between words that were congruent or incongruent with the action 
goal. Similarly, van Elk, van Schie, and Bekkering (2009) used a similar 
paradigm described above, but instead of the presentation of a word, they 
presented line drawings of body parts or animals. Participants were instructed to 
release the start button and perform the action with the object that was 
previously shown on the computer screen. The authors calculated reaction times 
in response to the line drawings. Results showed that for meaningful actions, 
participants initiated actions faster in response to line drawings that were 
congruent with the action goal. For example, when they were instructed to bring 
a cup to the line drawing of mouth, they were faster when the line drawing of 
mouth would appear. On the other hand, for meaningless actions, participants 
initiated actions slower in response to line drawings that were congruent with 
the action goal. For example, when they were instructed to bring a cup to the 
line drawing of eye, they were slower when the line drawing of mouth would 
appear. These results provide evidence to the convergent route model proposed 
by Yoon et al. (2002) with semantics playing a role in action production with 
known objects. In the current study, there was probably some sort of 
involvement of semantics in the two action production tasks both before and 
after practice. So, future studies using reaction time or neural data might 










5.0 Future Directions 
The results of this study provide promising insights into the possibility 
of using practice in order to help neurological patients. On a broader level, the 
results illustrate that with practice, healthy young people could decrease their 
reliance on semantic information when producing actions with objects. This 
observation provides a potential study to determine if using practice will help 
neurological patients; such as apraxic patients, in producing actions. A crucial 
part to this research will be to determine the sufficient amount of practice that 
will be needed to show significant improvements, if any, in action production. 
In addition, it would be interesting to see if practicing naming of objects will 
improve the naming performance of healthy people because in the current 
study, participants did not practice naming objects. If such improvement is 
observed, then it would be interesting to find out if patients with semantic 














 This study demonstrated that extensively practicing actions with novel 
objects decreased the influence of semantics when producing actions with novel 
objects. However, this practice did not change the influence of semantics when 
naming these novel objects and when producing actions with a cylindrical 
object. The results are in line with models that propose naming requires access 
to semantics and producing actions can be done with semantics; indirect route, 
or without semantics; direct route. In addition, the results of the study 
demonstrated that the direct route to action production seems to be strengthened 
after practicing object-action associations. The results offer new insights into 
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Table 1: Object-label-action associations for participants (h: hold, t: twist, s: 
slide, st: slide + twist, p: pull, pt: pull + twist, ps: pull +slide, pst: pull + slide + 
twist) 
Note: ‘I’ and ‘II’ refer to the version of assigning labels to objects 
 
 
Shape 1,1,1 1,1,0 101 1,0,0 0,1,1 0,1,0 0,0,1 0,0,0 
1 Action h t s st p pt ps pst 
I Name Chickadee Sparrow Milk Guitar Crow Robin Sand Sweater 
II  Milk Guitar Chickadee Sparrow Sand Sweater Crow Robin 
2 Action pst ps pt p st s t h 
I Name Sparrow Chickadee Milk Guitar Robin Crow Sweater Sand 
II  Milk Guitar Sparrow Chickadee Sweater Sand Robin Crow 
3 Action p pt ps pst h t s st 
I Name Sparrow Chickadee Sweater Sand Robin Crow Guitar Milk 
II  Sweater Sand Sparrow Chickadee Guitar Milk Robin Crow 
4 Action pst ps pt p st s t h 
I Name Crow Robin Guitar Sweater Sparrow Chickadee Sand Milk 
II  Guitar Sweater Crow Robin Sand Milk Sparrow Chickadee
5 Action h t s st p pt ps pst 
I Name Robin Crow Sand Sweater Chickadee Sparrow Milk Guitar 




Table 2: Order of testing deadline tasks on days 1 and 5 (N: naming, A: actions 
with novel objects, AC: actions with cylinder) 
Participant Version Day 1 Day 5 
1 I N A AC A AC N 
2 II N A AC A AC N 
3 I N AC A AC A N 
4 II N AC A AC A N 
5 I A N AC N AC A 
6 II A N AC N AC A 
7 I AC N A N A AC 
8 II AC N A N A AC 
9 I AC A N A N AC 



















Table 3: Side view of physical location of objects on modified manipulandum 
for three practice days; P1, P2 and P3 [O: (0,0,0), C: (1,0,0), T: (0,1,0), F: 
(0,0,1), CT: (1,1,0), CF: (1,0,1), TF: (0,1,1), CTF: (1,1,1)]  
Participant Version P1 P2 P3 
O T CF TF F CF CT T CT O CTF C 1 and 2 I and II 
CTF F CT C TF C O CTF F T TF CF
T TF CTF CT CF O TF C CTF CT T F 3 and 4 I and II 
C CF F O CT CTF T F CF TF O C 
CF CTF C F TF C CT CTF CT T O CF5 and 6 I and II 
T O CT TF F T CF O TF C F CTF
F O T C CTF T F CT CF TF CT O 7 and 8  I and II 
CT CTF CF TF O TF C CF T C CTF F 
CTF F CT CF T CT C O F C TF CTF9 and 10 I and II 





















This analysis compared the first and the second types of confusions that 
participants can make. Recall that the first type of confusion was confusing an 
object associated with a semantically similar label with another object 
associated with a semantically similar label (this will be defined here as a 
similar confusion). The second type of confusion was confusing an object 
associated with a semantically similar label with another object associated with 
a semantically dissimilar label (this will be defined here as a dissimilar 
confusion). Again, when participants said a wrong label, the researcher coded 
which two labels were confused. For example, if the objects’ label was ‘robin’ 
and the participant said ‘crow’; the researcher coded this error as confusion 
between semantically similar labels.  On the other hand, if the participant said 
‘sand’; the researcher coded this error as confusion between semantically 
dissimilar labels. Also, when participants produced a wrong action with the 
novel objects and with the cylinder, the researcher coded which two actions 
were confused. For example, if the object’s action was associated with a 
semantically similar label (such as robin) and the participant produced incorrect 
action of another object associated with semantically similar label (such as 
crow); the researcher coded this error as confusion between actions associated 
with semantically similar labels. On the other hand, if the participant produced 
incorrect action of another object associated with semantically dissimilar label 
(such as sand); the researcher coded this error as confusion between actions 
associated with semantically dissimilar labels. 
Only a subset of the data was included in this analysis so that visual 
object similarity and action similarity are held constant between the two types 
of confusions. There are twelve possible similar confusions. Eight of these 
confusions are between objects that are 1 CB apart, and four are between 




dissimilar confusions. Four of these confusions are between objects that are 1 
CB apart, eight are between objects that are 2 CBs part, and four are between 
objects that are 3 CBs apart. Because of these differences, visual object 
similarity and action similarity are not constant between the two types of 
confusions. Therefore, for similar confusions, only four out of eight confusions 
that are between objects that are 1 CB apart were included in this analysis. For 
dissimilar confusions, only four out of eight confusions that are between objects 
that are 2 CBs apart were included in this analysis. The result of this selective 
inclusion of data is that for both similar and dissimilar confusions, there are 
four confusions that are between objects that are 1 CB apart, and four are 
between objects that are 2 CBs apart. 
Similar to the previous analysis, a separate 2 time (before practice, after 
practice) x 2 semantic similarity (similar, dissimilar) repeated measures 
ANOVA for each task was performed. The task of naming was first analyzed 
(Figure 10). The analysis revealed a main effect of semantic similarity; F (1,9) 
= 21.493, p = 0.001. Participants made more naming errors for similar 
confusions (mean = 4.0, SD = 1.86) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 0.7, SD 
= 0.95). Also, there was an interaction between time and semantic similarity; F 
(1,9) = 12.964, p = 0.006. However the pattern of results was the same before 
and after practice. Therefore, when participants named objects before practice, 
they made more errors similar confusions (mean = 5.1, SD = 2.28) than 
dissimilar confusions (mean = 0.7, SD = 1.06); t (9) = 5.123, p < 0.001. 
Similarly, when participants named objects after practice, they made more 
errors for similar confusions (mean = 2.9, SD = 2.08) than dissimilar confusions 
(mean = 0.7, SD = 1.34); t (9) = 3.236, p = 0.005. Next, the task of actions with 
the cylinder was analyzed (Figure 11). The analysis revealed a main effect of 
time; F (1,9) = 25.138, p = 0.001. Participants produced more action errors 




























Similar Confusions Dissimilar Confusions
 
Figure 10. Mean number of naming novel objects errors to type of confusion as 

































Similar Confusions Dissimilar Confusions
 
Figure 11. Mean number of actions with cylinder errors with to type of 















0.63). There was also a main effect of semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 17.225, p = 
0.002. Participants made more action errors for similar confusions (mean = 
2.45, SD = 1.24) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 0.75, SD = 0.76). 
However, there was no interaction between time and semantic similarity; F 
(1,9) = 1.161, p = 0.309. Finally, the task of actions with the novel objects was 
analyzed (Figure 12). Again, the analysis revealed a main effect of time; F (1,9) 
= 12.531, p = 0.006. Participants produced more action errors before practice 
(mean = 3.7, SD = 2.57) than after practice (mean = 0.8, SD = 0.42). There was 
a main effect of semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 11.592, p = 0.008. Participants 
made more action errors for similar confusions (mean = 3.6, SD = 2.44) than 
dissimilar confusions (mean = 0.9, SD = 0.81). However, there was an 
interaction between time and semantic similarity; F (1,9) = 19.354, p = 0.002. 
When participants produced actions before practice, they made more similar 
confusions (mean = 6.2, SD = 4.42) than dissimilar confusions (mean = 1.2, SD 
= 1.40); t (9) = 3.899, p = 0.002. However, when participants produced actions 
after practice, they made equivalent number of errors for similar confusions 
(mean = 1.0, SD = 0.82) and dissimilar confusions (mean = 0.6, SD = 0.70); t 
































Similar Confusions Dissimilar Confusions
 
Figure 12. Mean number of actions with novel objects errors to type of 
confusion as a function of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
